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Doctors are generally not liable for murder if they 
withhold or withdraw treatment or provide palliative 
treatment that hastens death when the patient has 
made an advance directive, treatment is futile or the 
burdens and risks will outweigh the benefits of such 
treatment.[1] The usual view is that doctors are not liable because 
they do not intend to kill the patients in such circumstances, and the 
underlying illness, injury or condition causes the death.[2]
Such acts and omissions are said to constitute passive euthanasia, 
which is not regarded as murder, rather than active euthanasia. 
However, the distinction is artificial because what is sometimes 
called ‘passive’ euthanasia involves a positive act, e.g. switching off a 
ventilator[3] or turning down a pacemaker.[4]
To understand the real reason why doctors are not held legally 
liable in such circumstances we must examine the elements that 
constitute the crime of murder. It then becomes clear that doctors are 
not held liable for murder when they withhold or withdraw treatment 
or hasten the death of their patients through potentially fatal doses of 
medication, not because they do not have the legal intention to kill 
their patients or do not cause the death of their patients – but rather 
because society does not regard such conduct as wrongful.[5]
This is demonstrated by considering the legal position regarding the 
elements of murder in the context of the withholding or withdrawal of 
treatment and using palliative treatment that hastens death.
Murder
Murder is the intentional and unlawful killing of another human 
being.[6] For a conviction of murder it must be proved beyond 
reasonable doubt that: the act or omission was intentional; the 
alleged perpetrator caused the death; the killing was unlawful; and a 
human being was killed. The fact that a human being was killed is not 
usually in contention, but difficulties arise concerning the elements of 
intention, causation and unlawfulness.
Intention
Intention must be established in murder cases and may be ‘actual’ or 
‘eventual’. ‘Actual intention’ occurs where a person directs their will to 
kill a particular person.[7] ‘Eventual intention’ occurs where a person 
does not mean to kill a person but subjectively foresees the possibility 
of death because of their conduct and proceeds with such conduct. [7] 
For example, a doctor withholds or withdraws treatment or prescribes 
palliative treatment that hastens death despite subjectively foreseeing 
that the patient may die as a consequence.
There is a need to distinguish intention from motive. A person’s 
motive good or bad is irrelevant to criminal intent.[7] The intention 
required for murder is the direction of one’s will to kill a person 
(actual intention) or subjective foresight that a person may be killed 
(eventual intention). Motive is the reason behind the intention and 
in law is irrelevant except for the purpose of sentencing in criminal 
cases or damages in civil cases where it may be an aggravating or 
mitigating factor. Thus an unlawful act can never become lawful 
because of a good motive, but may reduce the sentence in murder 
cases (e.g. active euthanasia).[8]
A doctor who withholds or withdraws treatment or prescribes 
palliative treatment that hastens death may have a good motive – not 
to engage in futile treatment or to lessen pain for the patient – but 
legally has the eventual intention to kill the patient. However, the 
doctor cannot be held liable for murder if any of the other elements 
of the crime are missing.
Causation
For a conviction of murder it must be shown that the person caused 
the death of the deceased. ‘Causation’ refers to the act or omission that 
causes or accelerates death.[9] An accused person need not be the sole 
cause of the consequential death.[10] If one or more events contribute 
towards the death of a person, the event that finally hastens the death 
is regarded as its cause. Both types of causation – factual and legal – 
must be satisfied before a person will be held legally liable.[11]
In homicides, factual causation occurs where a person’s death would 
not have resulted ‘but for’ the original act or omission that ended in 
the death of the person.[10] For instance, if a person is seriously injured 
by a car and subsequently the ambulance transporting him to hospital 
collides with another car, causing his death – ‘but for’ the negligent 
driving of the first driver the person would not have died. However, 
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the first driver will not be liable unless he or she also legally caused 
the death of the person.
Legal causation occurs where the act or omission that caused the 
death is either a foreseeable or a direct cause of the person’s death. The 
foreseeability approach holds that if a person in the position of the 
perpetrator would have reasonably foreseen the likelihood of death and 
persisted with their act or omission, then the perpetrator legally caused 
the death of the deceased.[12] For instance, in the ambulance example, 
a person in the position of the first driver would not have reasonably 
foreseen that their negligent driving might lead to an injured person 
being taken in an ambulance that crashes and kills the patient. 
The direct consequence approach holds that the perpetrator 
is liable unless some new act intervenes between the original act 
or omission that resulted in the ultimate death of the deceased. 
Therefore, in the example the accident involving the ambulance that 
killed the patient was a new intervening act. However, the courts 
have held that an abnormal event which would otherwise be a new 
intervening act is not such an act if it was actually foreseen[13] or 
planned by the accused person.[14] Similarly, the victim’s pre-existing 
physical susceptibilities are not regarded as a new intervening act – 
‘the accused takes his victim as he finds him with all his pre-existing 
physical susceptibilities such as a weak heart or thin skull’.[15]
The courts in the UK ‘have been anxious to ensure that the cause 
of death was attributed to natural disease in all these cases of non-
voluntary assistance in dying’.[2] However, there is no doubt that doctors 
who withhold or withdraw treatment or prescribe a potentially fatal 
dose of palliative medication, subjectively foresee that their omissions 
or acts may result in the death of the patient. Therefore, the death 
cannot be attributed to a new intervening cause because the ensuing 
death is not an abnormal or unexpected event. Likewise, the pre-
existing illness or injury of a patient that eventuates when treatment 
is withheld or withdrawn, or potentially fatal palliative medication is 
administered is not legally regarded as a new intervening cause. 
As a result, in law, doctors who hasten the death of a terminally 
ill or injured patient by withholding or withdrawing treatment or 
administering a potentially fatal dose of medicine will have legally 
caused the death of the patient – although if any of the other elements 
are not satisfied they cannot be held liable for murder.
Unlawfulness
Unlawfulness must be established for a person to be convicted of 
murder. Whether or not a person’s act or omission is unlawful will 
depend upon the legal convictions of the community at the time.[16] 
Although it is not possible for a person to consent to doctor-assisted 
suicide in the form of active euthanasia,[8] it is trite that it is lawful for 
a mentally competent patient to refuse medical treatment even if such 
refusal will result in their death.
The courts have also held that it is not unlawful to withdraw 
treatment from patients where the prognosis is hopeless and medical 
interventions would amount to ‘a fruitless attempt to save the 
deceased’s life’.[3] Similarly, in an application to withdraw feeding from 
a patient in a persistent vegetative state with no hope of recovery 
who had been artificially fed for over three years, the court held 
that ‘judged by society’s legal convictions’ it would be reasonable, 
justifiable and not wrongful for the patient’s wife to be appointed as 
his curatrix and to order the withdrawal of such feeding even though 
it would lead to the patient’s death.[5]
In cases where such treatment is withheld or withdrawn because: the 
patient has made an advance directive (e.g. a living will); the treatment 
would be futile; or the burdens and risks will outweigh the benefits 
of such treatment (e.g. the treatment may keep alive a severely brain-
damaged patient), the courts and society do not regard the conduct as 
unlawful[1] – despite the doctors knowing that their omissions or acts 
will result in the death of the patient. The courts have held that where 
the prognosis for a persistent vegetative patient is hopeless and their 
treatment ‘did not serve the purpose of supporting human life as is 
commonly known’, the legal convictions of the community would not 
regard the cessation of artificial feeding as unlawful.[5]
Therefore, the real reason why doctors are not held liable for 
murder despite their intention to end the lives of their patients who 
are terminally ill or suffering unbearable pain, by withholding or 
withdrawing treatment or prescribing a potentially fatal palliative 
drug, is that their conduct is regarded as lawful – not because they did 
not intend their patients to die or did not cause their patients’ death. 
Legally, both these elements are present, but unlawfulness is not.
As has been said in the UK: ‘When, however, a treatment is 
discontinued solely by reason of its futility, there is nothing to be 
lost – and much to be gained by intellectual honesty – in attributing 
death, correctly, to “Lawful withdrawal of life support systems which 
were necessitated by [the disease]”’.[2] 
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